The ten agentic risks, and which ones we address.
The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, mapped to the badge, the door and the record. Some risks belong to your agent runtime or your models. Those rows say outside Ares.
ASI01 to ASI10.
Risk descriptions are short paraphrases. Read the OWASP list for the full text.
| The risk, in short | How Ares addresses it | Coverage | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack | Hidden instructions in content turn the agent toward another goal. | Content is inspected on the way in. Whatever the agent now wants, it can only do what the badge allows; the rest is refused at the door and written down. | Partial |
| ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation | The agent uses a legitimate tool in a harmful way. | Every tool call passes the door. Tools and actions outside the badge for this job are refused. | Yes |
| ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse | Agents inherit, borrow or escalate privileges they should not hold. | Each agent has its own identity. The badge narrows at every handoff, so no agent holds more than the one that called it. | Yes |
| ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | Third-party agents, tools or cards are compromised or change under you. | Third-party agents pass the same door as yours, under a badge you set. Alerts when a listed agent widens what it asks for are planned. | Partial |
| ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution | The agent writes or runs code it should not. | Outside Ares. Sandboxing what an agent executes is the agent runtime’s job. Ares governs what the agent may call, not what runs inside it. | Outside Ares |
| ASI06 Memory and Context Poisoning | Bad data planted in memory or context steers later steps. | The session holds which contexts are valid for this job, so a third party cannot inject one. What the agent keeps in its own memory is outside Ares. | Partial |
| ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication | Messages between agents are spoofed, read or tampered with. | Every agent-to-agent call carries a badge the receiving side checks at its door, with inspection both ways. This holds across organisations. | Yes |
| ASI08 Cascading Failures | One faulty agent’s output spreads through the chain. | Each hop is checked on its own, and the door fails closed. The record shows where a chain went wrong. Retries and resilience in your agents stay yours. | Partial |
| ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation | The agent misleads a person into approving something harmful. | Steps over a limit wait for a person, and the request they see is on the record next to their decision. Training the people is yours. | Partial |
| ASI10 Rogue Agents | An agent acts outside its intended role. | An agent outside its badge is refused at the door. Revoke its badges and it stops; the refusals and the revocation are on the record. | Yes |
Names from the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026; descriptions paraphrased. A tick is yes, a dot is partly. Not legal advice.
Why some rows say partly
Ares sits at the door between agents, tools and organisations. That makes it strong on privilege, delegation and inter-agent traffic, and the record is the evidence for all of it. It does not sit inside your model or your agent’s runtime, so risks that start and end there need controls there too. In market terms Ares is a policy enforcement point with an audit trail, not a model guardrail.
Take the mapping into your threat model.
The security pack covers the architecture, the data flows and how the record is protected, at the depth these pages leave out. We send it after a short NDA.